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The Rhetoric of Simon’s Adversary (Lysias 3)
Abstract: Negation and trivialization — these two chief objectives of the defense in Lys. 3, and, in 
fact, chief objectives of any defense whatsoever, are achieved in the speech firstly and foremostly 
through contrasting ethopoiiai. The speaker rebuts the claims of the plaintiff, arguing from prob-
ability, that unlike his adversary, he is not mad, and only a madman would be capable of doing the 
deeds he is being accused of. The speaker trivializes the incident under trial as unworthy of prosecu-
tion, unless of course, the prosecutor is a sycophant — like Simon. Underlying these is yet another 
tendency, conveyed through Simon’s hubristic ethopoiia. This tendency is voiced out in a theoretical 
treatise on composing successful speeches, claiming the authorship of Aristotle himself. Its argu-
ment is: “[…] it seems to me that it comes close to no injustice at all, whenever one is subject to the 
mistreatment by which he himself abused others, as for example, if someone batters (αἰκίσαιτο) one 
who is accustomed to assault others with hybris (ὑβρίζειν)” (Rhet. 1373a). Whatever befell Simon, 
he certainly had it coming. 
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The third speech preserved in the Corpus Lysiacum (henceforth Lys. 3) en-joys deserved interest the students of Greek rhetoric and history, and that 
not only because of the unique insights it offers into the some aspects of everyday 
life in ancient Athens, including those not always taught about in grade schools, 
but also because of the air of the sensational surrounding the events under trial: 
there is an almost clandestine love affair, fierce erotic rivalry, abduction, violence 
fuelled by wine and above all there are the characters, even if somewhat too one-
sided for the modern taste, vivid and captivating nonetheless.
The case under trial is legally defined as trauma ek pronoias, literally signi-
fying “intentional wounding”, though, as some have argued on the very basis of 
Lys. 3 (3.28, 41), embracing the meaning of “wounding with intent to kill”. The 
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latter interpretation is sometimes doubted, considered rather a biased interpretation 
of a defendant attempting to escape this charge1, there is no doubt however that an 
accusation of a trauma ek pronoias, just like other homicide cases, fell within the 
jurisdiction of the Areopagus, followed similar procedures2 and was generally classi-
fied among the phonikoi nomoi3. Despite the procedural similarity, there are reasons 
to believe that cases of trauma ek pronoias were, unlike homicides, open to both 
private (δίκη τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας) and public (γραφὴ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας) 
prosecution, with the former available only to the victim, and the latter to ‘any Athe-
nian who wishes so and has the right to it’ (ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν). 
Attempts have been made to represent Lys. 3 as belonging to either one, though with-
out decisive results4. The speech was written for an unnamed defendant5, accused of 
trauma ek pronoias by an otherwise obscure Simon. Whatever the procedural status 
of the case (were it a graphe, any Athenian citizen would be entitled to prosecute), it 
is the victim himself, i.e. Simon, who brings in the case before the court.
There is a basic pattern underlying all conflicts mediated by a third party, be 
it arbitration among the transhumant pastoralists of the Greek-Albanian frontier, 
or the Nomads of Cyrenaica on the one hand, and complex judicial litigation in 
modern nation-states on the other. In terms of ethnology this pattern is most clearly 
articulated by Black-Michaud on the example of Cyrenaican Bedouins6:
If the creditors [i.e. the injured party] think it to their advantage to seek com-
position rather than revenge, they will attempt by all every means in their
 
1 Thus D.M. MacDowel l: The Law in Classical Athens. London 1978: 123f; contra M.H. 
Hansen: “The Prosecution of Homicide in Athens: A. Reply”. GRBS 1981, Vol. 22 (1), p. 15; 
C. Ca rey: Lysias. Selected Speaches w. Introduction and Commentary. Cambridge 1989, p. 109 
(ad. 3.42); S.C. Todd: The Shape of Athenian Law. Oxford 1993, pp. 105, 272.
2 Cf. C. Ca rey: Lysias…, p. 92f (ad 3.1); S.C. Todd: Lysias. Speeches 1—11 w. Introduction 
and Commentary. Oxford 2007, p. 281f; quite certainly among these were solemn oaths (διωμοσία), 
mentioned in Lys. 3.1, sworn by both litigating parties at the beginning of the hearing-in-chief (for 
a detailed discussion see M.D. MacDowel l: Athenian Homicide Law. Manchester 1963, pp. 90—
100), cf. also M.D. MacDowel l: The Law…, p. 119; S.C. Todd: The Shape…, p. 273; E. Ca rawan: 
Rhetoric and the Law of Draco. Oxford 1998, pp. 138—147), and regulations against irrelevance 
alluded to in 3.45f (cf. M.D. MacDowel l: Athenian Homicide…, p. 43f).
3 Cf. M.D. MacDowel l: Athenian Homicide…; M.H. Hansen: The Prosecution…, p. 14f; 
S.C. Todd: Lysias…, p. 281ff.
4 C. Ca rey: Lysias…, p. 109 — γραφή; S.C. Todd: Lysias…, p. 284 — δίκη (‘tentatively’); 
Idem: The Skape…, p. 269 (γραφή — ‘generally’).
5 Cf. S.C. Todd: Lysias…, p. 276; C. Ca rey: Lysias…, p. 86.
6 J. Black-Michaud: Cohesive Force. London 1975, p. 101. Cf. the strategies meant ‘to ma-
nipulate the moral context’ in one’s favour in arbitrated disputes among XIX-century Montenegrins 
(C. Boeh m: Blood Revenge. Philadelphia 1987, p. 131).
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power to pressure the mediator into awarding them the maximum compensa-
tion, whilst the killer’s group will resist and, by skilful manipulation of the 
mediator, try to make minimal concessions in conditions least prejudicial to 
their prestige.
In a case tried before a court the offender becomes, of course, the defendant, and 
the strategies of “skilful manipulation” available to him in order to make “mini-
mal concessions” are threefold: downright negation, justification or trivialization. 
To put it more bluntly, if you can’t get out of it, either prove that you have done 
the right thing, or do your best to make it look like an insignificant trifle, unduly 
inflated by the adversary, and unworthy of the court’s attention. Lys. 3 is a defense-
argument ingeniously woven out of all these three patterns. There is blatant trivial-
ization of the incident under trial; there is also denial, and finally there is a distinct, 
though, understandably, less explicit attempt at justification. It should be noted in 
the first place that the Athenian law-courts were a locus convenient for such ma-
nipulations. The speakers generally were not constrained by requirements of truth-
fulness7, and with the exception of particular cases — of which, incidentally, Lys. 
3 is an example (see n. 2) — neither they nor their witnesses swore any kind of 
oath on a regular basis, and even when they did, perjury had no legal consequences 
whatsoever. False testimonies, accusations, not to mention abusive and frequently 
irrelevant slander8, were therefore constant features of everyday court-reality, and 
to an extent unthinkable in modern legal practice.
To lie however, is one thing; to lie persuasively — something quite different. 
We do not know (and probably never will), how much of what the speaker of 
Lys. 3 claims is true; we can however assess, to a limited degree, how persuasive 
his arguments might have been. This, of course, requires more than our purely 
personal appreciation of their credibility. The speaker’s argumentation should be 
appraised in the light of its proper context, its “background”, which in this case is 
the Athenian legal and ethical discourse, the discourse of which Lys. 3 otherwise 
forms part itself.
Let us begin by hearing it for Simon, whose arguments, unfortunately, are pre-
served only in his opponent’s speech, and hence fragmentary, and above all most 
likely distorted. In the prehistory of the case Simon has arranged a sexual contract 
7 A witness bringing in false testimony could have been subsequently sued by the opposing 
litigant through a δίκη ψευδομαρτυρίων, the penalties here are not known; cf. A.R.W. Ha r r i son: 
The Law of Athens. Vol. 2. London 1998, pp. 192—197ff; M.D. MacDowel l: The Law…, p. 244; 
M. Ch r is t: The Litigious Athenian. Baltimore 1998, p. 30f.
8 Slanderous accusations — at least in some specific cases (e.g. accusation of parricide) — could 
have been prosecuted through a δίκη κακηγορίας cf. M.D. MacDowel l: The Law…, pp. 126—129; 
S.C. Todd: The Shape…, p. 103; M. Ch r is t: The Litigious Athenian…, p.  39f; on slander (diabole) 
in the rhetoric of forensic oratory see C. Ca rey: “Rhetorical Means of Persuasion”. In: Persuasion, 
Greek Rhetoric in Action. Ed. J. Wor th i ng ton. London 1994, p. 31f.
38 Jan Kucharski
with a Plataean boy by the name Theodotus9, to whom he gave 300 drachmas 
for his favours. The speaker then enters into the story, seducing Theodotus and 
causing him to abandon Simon. After some time the speaker and Theodotus quite 
unexpectedly pay Simon a “visit”, upon which the very incident under trial took 
place (3.29):
He says that we came to his house carrying pottery, and that I threatened to 
kill him — and that this constitutes “premeditation”10.
The ‘pottery’ (ὄστρακον) allegedly carried by the speaker is, of course, the weap-
on with which he was to threaten his — alleged — victim. An incriminating detail, 
and quite probably a pivotal element of the subsequent charge — trauma ek pro-
noias — itself11.
Negation
The speaker’s version of events is, understandably, quite different. Having 
suffered harassments by the jealous Simon — who lost Theodotus’ favours not 
due to the speaker’s scheming, but due to his harsh and hubristic treatment of the 
boy — the speaker, accompanied by his young lover, decides to quit the country 
for some time. Upon his return he installed Theodotus at the house of his friend, 
Lysimachus, who lived near Simon’s place (3.11). The boy’s presence did not go 
unnoticed, and Simon along with some companions arranged to abduct him. As he 
and Theodotus were leaving Lysimachus’ house, Simon with his friends rushed at 
them, and attempted to seize the boy (3.12). Theodotus managed to escape, leaving 
 9 Theodotus’ social status has been subject to controversy; in 3.33 we are told of the possibility 
of extracting depositions from him under torture (μηνῦσαι δὲ ἱκανὸν ἦν βασανιζόμενον), which 
strongly suggests that he was a slave; on the other hand we hear nothing of Theodotus’ master, 
whose intervention one would naturally expect in the course of the affairs recounted; the majority 
view (accepted by C. Ca rey: Lysias…, p. 87) balances nonetheless towards the slave-hypothesis, 
some however find it more plausible to view Theodotus as a free non-citizen (including S.C. Todd: 
Lysias…, p. 281, where (279ff) an overview of the discussion so far is given.
10 Translation by S.C. Todd in: Idem: Lysias. Speeches 1—11 w. Introduction, Translation 
and Commentary. Oxford 2007. Unless indicated otherwise, all translations of Lysias are taken from 
this edition.
11 A tentative and brief reconstruction of Simon’s case is presented by C. Ca rey: Lysias…, 
p. 90f: upon being denied the favours of Theodotus, for which he payed 300 drachmas, Simon ‘re-
peatedly demanded that the boy repay the money or return to him’, to which the speaker responded 
in paying Simon a visit and warning him ‘to keep away’ — apparently in a manner not quite friendly 
nor polite.
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his cloak in the hands of his would-be kidnappers, and sought refuge in the fuller’s 
shop owned by a Molon (3.15). In the meantime the speaker (3.13), believing 
that the boy managed to escape, ‘walked away’ (ᾠχόμην ἀπιών). The attackers 
however did not give up their pursuit: they barged into Molon’s place and dragged 
out Theodotus screaming and calling for witnesses (3.16). Trying to help the boy, 
Molon, the unfortunate fuller, also received his share of the beating, as did some 
other concerned bystanders (3.17). As Simon and his consorts lead the unwilling 
youngster home, they run again into the speaker, who attempts to pull their victim 
away, and demands explanation. Quite predictably, he is attacked: ‘a brawl’ (μάχη, 
θόρυβος) ensues in which both sides get their heads cracked (3.18).
As for the incident under trial, the diegesis makes it clear that: 1) the trauma 
ek pronoias described by Simon in his accusation never took place; 2) both the 
speaker and Simon were slightly injured in a brawl initiated by the latter; this con-
tention is supported in a sequence of “proofs” (21—45), aimed at discrediting the 
case itself along with the credibility of plaintiff/prosecutor on the one hand, and 
specifically at rebutting the charge of pronoia along with.
The pistis aimed at rebutting the charges of pronoia is a simple argument from 
probability12. It is highly unlikely that the speaker, accompanied only by Theodo-
tus, would arrive with the intention of killing (or at least threatening to do so) at 
the house of Simon, where his would-be victim entertained a large group of men13, 
who would be more than eager to give the intruder a severe and humiliating beat-
ing (29). It might be conceivable that the speaker indeed attempted such a reck-
less attack, acting out of passion, on the condition that the young Theodotus were 
entertained at that time by Simon. The very fact that the boy was keeping his, not 
Simon’s, company however, strips the latter’s accusations of any logos (31). In 
doing what he is being accused of the speaker would not be right in the head; such 
behaviour would be a symptom of mania (29) and amathia (34) on his part.
Trivialization
Thus the speaker attempts to prove that the event described by Simon never 
took place. At the same time however he is far from denying the fight altogether, 
nor is he disclaiming any responsibility whatsoever for hurting Simon. The cir-
cumstances of this wounding, however, present the whole incident in a very differ-
12 On pisteis derived from character see in general C. Ca rey: “Rhetorical Means…,” pp. 34—
43 (with 40f on Lysias’ mastery in characterization).
13 C. Ca rey: (Lysias…, p. 106, ad loc.) rightly observes that “Simon could reply to this that the 
speaker did not know this in advance”.
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ent light. There was indeed a street brawl, initiated by Simon and his companions, 
in which both sides got their heads knocked a little. The relevant passage deserves 
full quotation:
μάχης δὲ γενομένης, ὦ βουλή, καὶ τοῦ μειρακίου βάλλοντος αὐτοὺς 
κἀμοῦ περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμυνομένου καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς βαλλόντων, 
ἔτι δὲ τυπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης κἀκείνου ἀμυνομένου, καὶ τῶν 
παραγενομένων ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ἡμῖν ἁπάντων ἐπικουρούντων, ἐν τούτῳ 
τῷ θορύβῳ συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες. (3.18)
A battle developed, members of the council. The young man was pelting 
them. He was defending his own life. They were pelting us. They were still 
hitting him, because they were drunk. I was defending myself. The passers-
by were all helping us, because we were the ones who were being wronged. 
And in the course of this melée, we all got our heads broken.
The description of the thorybos is in itself a thorybos of words with a wild run 
of absolute genitives both in content and in form signifying the rapid exchange 
of blows. The picture of an ostrakon-wielding Nemesis, deliberately wounding 
(27) and hurling deadly threats at his victim, is thus replaced by that of a cluttered 
street-brawl resulting in minor and, by implication, accidental (cf. ἔτυχον, 41) in-
juries on both sides14. There was no sinister malice but a trivial erotic rivalry. And 
it would be, the argument follows, a dreadful (δεινόν) thing to bring exile upon 
anyone on account of such trifles (43).
Simon’s Ethopoiia I: The “Mental” Simon
As already noted, the refutation of the charge of pronoia is an argument from 
probability: the speaker could not behave the way Simon described it, unless he 
suffered from madness (mania). Madness however is explicitly given as a char-
acter trait of Simon himself (7). His behaviour, leading to the first incident, al-
most exactly mirrors that refuted by the speaker himself. Enraged by the fact that 
Theodotus was entertained by the speaker, Simon seeks him out. Despite the fact 
that the speaker is in the company of friends (and the boy, apparently) ‘dining’ 
(ἐδειπνοῦμεν), he calls him out from the street, and upon meeting him face to face 
attacks him. We do not know, whether or not Simon was at that point alone, though 
14 C. Ca rey: (Trials from Classical Athens. London 1997, p. 82) takes the fight to be repre-
sented ‘as a confused and slightly comic affair’ and ‘a petty squabble unworthy of the attention of 
the Areopagos’.
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no mention is made here of his cronies, who accompanied him in his intrusion into 
the speaker’s gynaikonitis. The fact that he was easily repelled (and forced to re-
sort to “ranged attack”), and that his friends did not approve of his previous actions 
(δεινὰ ἡγοῦμενοι ποιεῖν), may suggest that by that time he was alone.
Accusing one’s adversary of madness may seem to us a questionable strategy: 
in modern jurisprudence such claim would be far more likely exploited to his ad-
vantage than detriment. In the Athenian public discourse (encompassing not only 
all forms of oratory, but also other public logoi, such as drama) however, words 
denoting insanity were freely used in vilifications, and commonly associated with 
moral reproach; to quote K. Dover (p. 127): “Morally shameless behaviour, car-
ried to an abnormal point, could be treated as evidence of insanity”15. Such is the 
treatment of this issue in the rhetoric of Simon’s adversary. His “mad” behaviour 
is condemned as most unnatural (ἀτοπώτατον) and unbelievable (ἀπιστότατον); 
such evaluation points not only to its recklessness and foolishness but to the fact 
that it is presented as yet another step in an offense subject to far more serious 
charges both from the moral and from the legal standpoint. For if Simon’s attack 
on the speaker when he enjoyed a deipnon with his friends was a symptom of ma-
nia, his previous intrusion into his house, and most importantly into the seclusion 
of his gynaikonitis, is explicitly condemned as an act of hybris (7). Evaluated thus 
are also Simon’s physical assaults on the speaker (23, 40) and his mistreatment 
of the young Theodotus, both during the incident under trial (17, 26) and in its 
prehistory (5).
Simon’s Ethopoiia II: The Hybristes
In classical Athens hybris and its cognates denoted not only moral censure 
(let alone a metaphysical pride — a meaning ascribed to it by later misreadings of 
Greek tragedy) but also a serious offence liable even to capital punishment. What 
exactly constituted an act of hybris? The relevant law, cited by Demosthenes, is 
typically vague when it comes to defining its categories (D. 21.47):
If anyone treats with hybris (ὑβρίζῃ) any person, either child or woman or 
man, free or slave, or does anything unlawful (παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ) against 
any of these, let anyone who wishes, of those Athenians who are entitled (ὁ 
βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν), submit a graphe to the thesmothetai16.
15 On the issue of mental health in moral evaluation in Greek see K. Dover: Greek Popular 
Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. London 1974, p. 126—129; cf. S.C. Todd: Lysias…, 
p.  315 who notes that ‘insanity is in no sense a defense in Athenian law’.
16 D.M. MacDowel l: Demostenes. Against Meidias. Oxford 1990.
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While it specifies clearly who can be the victim of hybris and what procedures 
are to be undertaken against the offender (voluntary prosecution), the offense it-
self is given no attention, as if the meaning of ὑβρίζειν was to obvious to merit 
explanation17. Significant, however not decisive, information as to what sort of 
behaviour was liable to the procedures prescribed by the law, can be gathered 
from rhetorical practice (extant speeches) and theory (Aristotle’s Rhetoric). The 
most conspicuous feature of hybris is its association with physical violence. These 
two however should not be equated, for not every wanton use of force was and 
could have been considered an act of hybris, but only that aimed at dishonouring 
(ἀτιμάσαι; ἀτιμία) the victim (Ar., Rh. 1374a, 1378b; D. 21.72). Aristotle however, 
makes it clear that physical violence need not be a necessary factor here (ἔστι γὰρ 
ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, 1378b)18, and 
there is evidence suggesting that such actions may have also been subject to pros-
ecution through graphe hybreos. A more specific aspect of hybris was its relation 
to various forms of sexual misconduct. The obvious delicts encompassed by this 
notion were acts of sexual violence; hybris and its cognates however, were also ap-
plied in forensic oratory to illegal relations based on consent: the speaker of Lys. 1 
speaks of adultery as δεινοτάτη ὕβρις (1.3), though Athenian law provided other, 
by far harsher than graphe hybreos, means of dealing with this issue19.
Simon’s behaviour is not only evaluated as hybris; more than once the speaker 
asserts that he ought to have been brought into court for his misdeeds (1, 9, 44). 
In the peroratio the speaker slips in what can be interpreted as an allusion to such 
prosecution, stating “that it would be far more just for him to be on trial for his life 
than for him to put other people in danger of exile” (44, tr. Todd). This is usually 
taken as a generic insult, an unspecified accusation of crimes liable to capital pun-
ishment20; it may well be so, however of the numerous misdeeds imputed to Simon 
in the speech, only hybris could have resulted in a prosecution of this kind.
The most obvious aspect of Simon’s behaviour considered as hybris is, of 
course, violence. Its only hubristic feature lies however in that it is wanton, un-
provoked. Unlike Ariston, the speaker of D. 54, and Demosthenes himself, in his 
famous speech against Meidias, who, while accusing their adversaries of hybris21, 
17 For a discussion on the text of the law see D.M. MacDowel l: Demosthenes…, ad loc.; 
N. Fishe r: Hybris. Warminster 1992, p. 36f.
18 Cf. N. Fishe r: Hybris…, 42; 92ff (verbal insults); D. Cohen: Law, Violence, and Commu-
nity. Cambridge 1995, pp. 146—149.
19 On hybris in illicit sexual relations based on consent see N. Fishe r: Hybris…, p. 41, 104f; 
D. Cohen: Law, Violence…, 154f; on the relation of women’s sexual purity to the question of 
masculine honour / dishonour see D. Cohen: Law, Sexuality and Society. Cambridge 1991, pp. 
133—170.
20 C.C. Ca rey: Lysias…, p. 111 (ad loc.); S.C. Todd: Lysias…, p. 340 (ad loc.).
21 Neither of them however actually brought in a graphe hybreos. Ariston’s case is a δίκη 
αἰκείας, a private lawsuit for violent attack: according to the speaker (54.1) he was persuaded by his 
friends to resort to this less serious charge, instead of the grave γραφὴ ὕβρεως, for the latter might 
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devote considerable effort to describe the humiliation suffered at their hands, the 
speaker does not care to make any mention of being dishonoured by Simon’s as-
saults. Furthermore, both attacks were met with successful defense — or, in fact, 
retaliation, since the verb ἀμύνεσθαι encompasses both meanings, and in some 
contexts unambiguously invites the latter interpretation. During the first incident 
the speaker managed thus to repel Simon, and force him to “ranged attack”, while 
during their second clash it was obviously Simon, who got the worse of it.
Simon’s mistreatment of Theodotus and his intrusion into the speaker’s oikos 
may seem a far more serious matter. As for the prehistory of the incident under 
trial, we are told that “through hybris (ὑβρίζων) and lawlessness (παρανομῶν) 
he decided to force him [scil. Theodotus — J.K.] to do whatever he wanted” 
(5)22, which clearly points to sexual violence, perhaps even rape. The same sin-
ister overtones are present in the description of the boy’s abduction (17), where 
the speaker witnessed him ‘subjected to violent and lawless hybris’ (ἀνόμως καὶ 
βιαίως ὑβρισθέντα). The law quoted above provided support for anyone, regard-
less of age, sex and social status, who fell victim to hybris. Judging therefore from 
the version of events presented in the speech, Simon’s conduct here could have 
been liable to prosecution through graphe hybreos. Finally the intrusion into the 
speaker’s house, twice in the text referred to as hybris. The only act of violence 
actually associated with it is Simon knocking the door down (6). Though such a 
display of komastic behaviour, along with Simon’s liking for a drink (during both 
incidents he is said to have been inebriated) are common narrative motifs in the 
representation of hybris, the most offensive aspect appears to be his entering into 
the gynaikonitis23. In Lys. 1 such violation of the seclusion of one’s oikos is twice 
explicitly referred to as hybris (1.4; 1.25); by contrast, the speaker of D. 47 is care-
ful to demonstrate that upon entering his (then) adversary’s house he knew that he 
was not married — and that, by chance, the door was open (47.38)24.
Simon’s Ethopoiia III: The Sycophant
Violence is the dominant theme of Simon’s ethopoiia, but not the only one. 
Apart from being a bully, he is also a liar and a sycophant, and these two traits 
have been more than could cope with. Demosthenes’ on the other hand, a προβολή, formally dealing 
with misconduct in relation to a festival (ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν).
22 On the relation of sexual (especially homosexual) violence with hybris see C. Cohen: Law, 
Violence…, pp. 149—161; N. Fishe r: Hybris. Warminster 1992, p. 108ff.
23 Cf. C. Cohen: Law, Violence…, p. 149.
24 Cf. 47.50: εἰς μὲν τὴν οἰκίαν οὐκ εἰσῆλθεν (οὐ γὰρ ἡγεῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ παρόντος γε 
τοῦ κυρίου).
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are, quite understandably, closely intertwined. A lie is the founding principle of 
Simon’s case against the speaker: this is stated explicitly by means of the elen-
chos, and implied through the whole diegesis, which presents an account of the 
incident radically different from that given in the accusation. As already noted 
lying in Athenian courts, even when under oath, did not in itself entail liability to 
punishment (with the exception of witnesses). Sycophancy however, apart from 
the indirect checks against it prescribed by the law, was considered a “public” 
crime, and therefore was itself liable to prosecution by οἱ βουλόμενοι by means of 
diverse procedures.
In the defense against Simon, however, sycophancy may seem at first glance 
a strained, if not downright misguided accusation. According to the traditional 
appraisal of this phenomenon, sycophants were a quasi-professional group of 
Athenian citizens, who made their living from abusing the principle of public 
accusation, whereby prosecution was made available to οἱ βουλόμενοι25. Their 
main interest consequently lied in the possibility of financial gains from bring-
ing in such a prosecution. These included out-of-court settlements on the one 
hand (with the would-be accused paying the sycophant off to drop the case)26, 
and monetary rewards for conducting a successful prosecution on the other. 
Hence, it has been argued, among the procedures most favoured by sycophants 
were not only those available to anyone “who wishes to do so”, but most im-
portantly those among them promising the greatest profit for their sycophantic 
efforts27. The case brought in by Simon may well have been neither (if it was 
a δίκη τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας), and certainly not the latter (even as a γραφή it 
would not bring any financial gain to the successful prosecutor). Furthermore, 
according to the traditional interpretation, the sycophants, as a rule, were not 
the injured party: their motivation was pecuniary, not vindictive. This appears 
to make the case for the speaker’s claim even worse, for it was precisely Simon 
himself, the prosecutor, who fell victim to the alleged wounding with intent to 
kill. 
According to the traditional interpretation, the cases where allegations of syco-
phancy are most likely to be found, would be defenses in public prosecutions, espe-
cially those in φάσεις, ἀπογραφαὶ and γραφαὶ ξενίας. Strangely enough however, 
the defense contra Simonem is by no means the only one where such — appar-
ently misguided — allegations are found. According to Osborne, in private cases 
“defendants […] almost invariably alleged that the prosecution was sycophantic, 
25 J.O. Lof berg: Sycophancy in Athens. Chicago 1917 passim; cf. MacDowell’s ‘Sycophancy’ 
in OCD3, where, however, gaining ‘political or oratorical reputation’ is also mentioned among the 
motives for sycophantic prosecutions.
26 Such was the predicament of Crito, who, according to Xenophon (Mem. 2.9.2), complained 
of being harrassed by sycophants who believed he would find it more advantageous to pay them of 
instead of πράγματα ἔχειν. 
27 That is φάσεις, ἀπογραφαὶ and γραφαί ξενίας (J.O. Lof berg: Sycophancy…, pp. 26—32).
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and they did so both in bringing injunctions and in making their main defence”28. 
In doing so they could not seriously base their allegations on the traditional (mod-
ern) view of sycophancy. Hence the attempt to redefine this term in relation to 
Classical Athens, whereby sycophancy was “a conceptual rather than sociological 
phenomenon”29. As such it does share some characteristics of the social-class view 
of sycophancy, most notably the money-grubbing attitude30, many other however, 
though inextricably linked with the traditional appraisal, are far from being the 
core-traits of this phenomenon. The emerging picture of a sycophant from vari-
ous rhetorical accusations is that of a person, who, apart from being motivated by 
financial gains31, (1) brings in false charges, in which he resorts to (2) sophistical 
quibbling and (3) slanderous attacks (διαβολή); a sycophant furthermore is a (4) 
litigious person, frequently filing in lawsuits, and finally often (5) “acts after the 
event and rakes up old charges”32.
With these traits of the “conceptual” sycophant we are on more familiar ground 
to assess the validity, or rather persuasiveness, of the accusations in Lys. 3. Simon 
has brought a false charge against the speaker, which is derived from the already 
discussed argument from probability. Simon’s claim that the speaker disregarded 
his financial agreement with Theodotus is slander, for, according to the elenchos, 
no such thing ever took place. Simon didn’t have the courage (οὐκ ἐτόλμησε, 39) 
to bring in his suit directly after being beaten and robbed of his lover; instead he 
waited four years, fearing for himself (20), and proceeded with his accusation only 
after the speaker fared ill in his own court dealings (20). This, of course, conforms 
with the last of the sycophantic traits discussed above.
In case these particular accusations of hybris and sycophancy, firmly rooted in 
the diegesis of the speech, weren’t enough to dispose the judges adequately towards 
his adversary, the speaker is not sparing on a generic evaluative language either. 
Quite unsurprisingly Simon’s previous misdeeds, are referred to as ἁμαρτήματα 
(9), and, as they are made to constitute serious breaches of law, consequently cen-
sured as παράνομα (37)33; a description of his disorderly violence is predictably 
followed by derogatory adjectives ἀκοσμότατος and πονηρότατος, with the lat-
ter’s substantive cognate, πονηρία given as a permanent trait of his ethos (9, 30, 
44), manifesting itself in his unruly behaviour. In the semantic sphere, however, the 
28 R. Osbor ne: “Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens”. In: Nomos. Essays in Athenian 
Law. Politics and Society. Eds. P. Ca r t ledge, P. Mi l le t, S.C. Todd. Cambridge 1990, p. 92.
29 M. Ch r is t: The Litigious Athenian…, p. 64f, drawing from the arguments of Osborne and 
Harvey, though the latter argues plausibly (114ff) that ‘professional sycophants’ may well have ex-
isted in Classical Athens.
30 Discussed by D. Ha r vey: „The Sycophant and Sycophancy”. In: Nomos…, p. 110ff.
31 Ibidem, p. 112ff; corroborated by M. Ch r is t: The Litigious Athenian…
32 D. Ha r vey: “The Sycophant…”, p. 113.
33 It should be noted that the notion παράνομον is closely associated with the law of hybris 
quoted above (D. 21.47): ἐάν τις ὑβρίζῃ εἴς τινα […] ἢ παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ.
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most prominent themes or keywords of Simon’s vilification are: δεινόν and τόλμα. 
δεινόν is an ambivalent notion and has no fixed ethical meaning. When applied to 
wrongs committed or suffered, it provides however convenient and conventional 
means of rhetorical amplification. As such, δεινόν becomes the one of the keywords 
in Simon’s vilification, and its significance is marked from the very beginning of the 
speech: πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ συνειδὼς Σίμωνι (3.1). His misdeeds thus represented are 
no ‘ordinary’ ἁμαρτήματα or παράνομα, but acts of ‘unbelievable’ (ἄπιστον) and 
‘unnatural’ (ἄτοπον) gravity — indeed acts of a madman. Their contrast with the 
trivial συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες could not be more evident.
To do anything δεινόν — regardless of its moral and legal quality — is always 
a daring attempt, and as such requires an adequate, “daring” disposition. Both 
these aspects of appraising one’s behaviour are conveyed by the word τόλμα along 
with its verbal and adjectival derivatives. A “daring” ἁμάρτημα or παράνομόν τι 
is, again, something much “bigger” than an ordinary misdemeanor. Just like the 
epithet δεινόν, τόλμα (and its derivates) hyperbolizes the deed, shifting it from 
the realm of the ‘ordinary’ to the ‘unnatural’ and ‘unbelievable’. The semantics 
of δεινόν and τόλμα provide also an evaluative bridge linking the present and the 
past: the series of unnatural crimes committed by Simon both in the prehistory and 
the history of the incident under trial is concluded with his final, ultimate act of 
τόλμα: bringing in a sycophantic lawsuit against the speaker (1, 20).
The Positive Paradigm
Simon’s negative ethopoiia would not be complete without a positive ethi-
cal paradigm, bringing out even further its alleged depravity. As observed by 
Carey: “[…] the case for the defence relies heavily on a tapestry of contrasting 
characterization”34. Unsurprisingly the contrasting exemplar is provided by the 
persona of the speaker himself. His character traits diametrically oppose those of 
Simon in all three respects, where the latter is represented as failing so badly: 
mental sanity, violence (hybris) and litigiousness (sycophancy). Yet again, as in the 
negative ethopoiia of his adversary, they are closely tied with each-other.
As already noted, the speaker draws his refutation of Simon’s version of events 
from probability, founding it upon the simple premise that only a madman would 
be capable of such actions (29, 34). Barging into his enemies house, even if he had 
reasons to believe that Theodotus is there, would be something “more stupid than 
is probable” (ἀνοητότερόν τι τῶν εἰκότων, 31, tr. Todd). Elsewhere the speaker is 
34 C. Ca rey: Trials…, p. 82; cf. S. Usher: Greek Oratory. Tradition and Originality. Oxford 
1999, p. 91.
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at pains to persuade the jury that throughout his involvement with Theodotus (and 
harassment by Simon) he was always careful not to appear ‘foolish’ (ἀνόητος) 
and hence notorious (περιβόητος) to his fellow-citizens. For this very reason he 
decided not to bring in any lawsuit, despite the frequent acts of hybris to which he 
was — allegedly — subjected (7, 23, 40). The issue of mental sanity and notori-
ety becomes thus intertwined with the other two prominent features of speaker’s 
positive ethopoiia: his non-litigiousness and non-aggressive disposition. This is 
poignantly summed up in the rhetorical question binding these two patterns of his 
rebuttal (3.31)
I sought to keep the peace so as not to become notorious, in the belief that his 
wickedness was my own misfortune. Can I really (as he claims) have devel-
oped a passion, after a time, to be notorious again?
The speaker’s non-aggressive and non-litigious ethopoiia has recently been subject 
to a controversy spawning some extreme and equally misguided interpretations. It 
has been argued, that the speaker casts himself into the role of a cowering wimp, 
who avoiding violence at all costs and puts up with repeated insults. In doing this, 
the argument follows, he attempts to win the sympathy of the judges, by appealing 
to sentiments allegedly common to the Athenian morality, that is non-vindictive-
ness, moderation and under-reaction to provocation35.
Let us start our scrutiny of these traits from the narrative in which they are 
rooted. The only passages obliquely admitting the claim to cowardice on the part 
of the speaker are those related to the episode in which Simon and his cronies am-
bushed him and Theodotus: 
It was at this moment that I arrived from Peiraieus, and because I was passing 
I called at Lysimakhos’ house. We spent a short time inside, and then came 
out. These men, who were by now drunk, jumped out on us. Some of those 
who were present with him refused to join in this criminal behaviour, but Si-
mon here, together with Theophilos, Protarkhos, and Autokles, began dragging 
away the young man. He, however, threw off his cloak and ran away. (3.12)
No mention whatsoever is made of any form of any physical assault upon the 
speaker here. Assuming that Theodotus will have escaped the speaker himself 
35 “The speaker is deliberately casting himself in the role of what we would now call a wimp, a 
man who under-reacts to provocations […] instead of demanding satisfaction for all these far from 
trifling humiliations, he claims to have put up with them” (G. Her man: Morality and Behaviour 
in Democratic Athens. Cambridge 2006, p. 167, reiterating the arguments from Idem: “Honour, 
Revenge and the State in Fourth-Century Athens”. In: Die Athenische Demokratie. Hrsg. W. Eder. 
Stuttgart 1995, p. 46 and G. Her man: “Athenian Beliefs About Revenge”. PCPS 2000, No 46, 
p. 23f); a persuasive refutation of Herman’s views is offered by Harris 364f; without lapsing into 
Herman’s extreme interpretations S.C. Todd: (Lysias…, p. 284f) nonetheless considers the speak-
er’s cowardice as a ‘venial flaw’ serving to ‘render his character more credible’
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takes off choosing a different route (3.13). Later on he builds an argument from 
probability upon this very incident:
Which group ought you to consider responsible for what happened: those who 
ran away (φεύγοντας), or those who tried to catch them? For my part, I think 
it is clear to everybody that the people who flee (φεύγουσι) are those who are 
afraid for themselves, whereas the ones who pursue are those who want to do 
something unpleasant. (3.36)
The referentially oblique φεύγοντας and φεύγουσι36 is as close as it comes to any 
admission of cowardice on the part of the speaker. The diegesis makes it clear 
though that the only one whom the attackers tried to catch was Theodotus. Fur-
thermore, in both descriptions of this incident, there is a marked contrast between 
the speaker’s behaviour, referred to with the phrases ἑτέραν ὅδον ᾠχόμην ἀπιών 
(3.13) and ἑτέραν ὅδον ἀπελθὼν ᾠχόμην (3.36) and those of the young Theodo-
tus, who in the very same passages is said to ᾤχετο φεύγων (3.13), ἐκφεύξεσθαι 
(3.13) and φεῦγον ᾤχετο (3.36). The slave-boy is indeed depicted as hastily and 
perhaps cowardly, fleeing the scene; the speaker himself calmly ‘walks away’. 
Whatever he may be hinting at, he obviously shrinks from explicitly describing his 
behaviour as anything beneath a dignified recession.
As for Simon’s physical assaults upon the speaker two incidents are related in 
the diegesis: the first (3.8), an unprovoked attack, and the second (3.17), a violent 
response to the speaker’s indignant reprimands (‘why are you treating the boy so 
lawlessly’), where it is clearly stated that Simon managed to deliver some blows at 
him; during the first assault, however, he was repelled by the speaker and forced to 
“ranged attack”, whereas during the second himself injured badly enough to bring 
in the trial at hand on this very basis (with significantly differing circumstances 
though). Neither of these accounts of violent incidents allows an interpretation 
of the speaker’s behavior as that of a cowering wimp. Instead he consistently 
presents himself as firmly holding his ground when attacked; furthermore, his ac-
tions in both incidents are described with the verb ἀμύνεσθαι, which apart from 
denoting ‘defense’ also encompassed the meaning of ‘avenging’. In fact, these two 
concepts were closely related to each-other in the legal and ethical discourse of 
Classical Athens37, not mutually exclusive, as one might expect judging from mod-
ern standards. Thus the speaker of Lys. 3 can even be considered as both defend-
ing himself and retaliating on the spot at once, though, as the circumstances both 
then (violent assault) and now (pleading ‘not guilty’ when accused of premeditated 
36 Todd (ad. loc.) notices a verbal play on the double meaning of φεύγων: running away — 
defendant.
37 On the meaning of ἀμύνομαι see LSJ s.v. B; the most instructive rhetorical example in this re-
spect is Ant. 4 (Third Tetralogy), where the defendant’s case of mortal ἀμύνασθαι is founded on the 
fact that the victim had started the fight (ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων); more on this case see M. Gaga r i n: 
Antiphon. The Speeches. Cambridge 1997, p. 160ff; E. Ca rawan: Rhetoric…, pp. 301—308.
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wounding) may suggest, with a greater emphasis upon the ‘defense’ element. Quite 
the same, though with far less serious outcomes, as a certain Euthynus, mentioned 
by Demosthenes (21.71), who upon being subjected to hybris by an equally ob-
scure Sophilus (αὐτὸν ὑβρίζειν ᾤετο), defended himself / retaliated so vigorously 
that his attacker ended up dead (ἀμυνάμενον οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι)38.
To sum up, the speaker’s characterization in respect to the issue of violence, 
produces an ethos no doubt antithetical to that of a hubristic bully, that is — to that 
of Simon. Unlike his adversary, the speaker is not prone to violence, and ready to 
avoid it. This however to a certain degree, for when attacked he stands his ground 
and does not hesitate to respond with force to hybris. Thus in his ethopoiia, while 
persuasively lending credibility to the refutation of Simon’s charges (wounding 
with malicious intent), the speaker manages nonetheless to steer clear of the ethical 
Charybdis of a cowardly wimp.
The speaker, having suffered many indignities from Simon, not only refrained 
from extralegal, violent retaliation — with the exception, that is, of the act of 
ἀμύνεσθαι upon being attacked — but also chose not to bring in any lawsuit against 
his enemy. This course of action marks a strong contrast with Simon’s sycophantic 
behaviour. It has been argued however, that the speaker’s non-litigious attitude is 
yet another appeal to the non-vindictive sentiments, allegedly pervading the Athe-
nian popular morality, and ruling over the minds of the jury. A good Athenian, the 
argument follows, was expected not only to forego violent retaliation, but also to 
refrain from attempting to right his wrongs through the courts: these were to be 
approached only in the utmost necessity, while lesser wrongs — endured patiently 
by the humane Athenian folk. There are, however, less imagination-straining ex-
planations for the speaker’s non-litigious attitude. The first is given in the text of 
the speech itself (3.9):
I chose not to bring an action over these offences, rather than to appear fool-
ish (ἀνόητος) to my fellow-citizens. I knew that what had happened would be 
seen as appropriate for a criminal like him (τούτου τῇ πονηρίᾳ πρέποντα ἔσται 
τὰ πεπραγμένα), but that I would be laughed at for my misfortunes. (Todd)
Why exactly would the speaker appear foolish (ἀνόητος) to his fellow-citizens? 
Surely not for attempting to punish Simon’s poneria!39 The problem was the con-
38 It has been argued that Euthynus may have been tried at the Delphinium upon pleading justi-
fied in the homicide for the very reason of defending / avenging an insult. According to D. 21.75 he 
was condemned, but only by one vote and that without resorting to excessive pleading; cf. the discus-
sion in D.M. MacDowel l: Demostenes…, p. 292 (ad loc.); E. Ca rawan: Rhetoric…, p. 308ff and 
D.M. MacDowel l: Athenian Homicide…, p. 75f (general).
39 A claim made by G. Her man: (Honour…, p. 46; Idem: Athenian Beliefs…, p. 23f), refuted 
by V.W. Ha r r i s: (“Lysias III and the Athenian Beliefs about Revenge”. CQ 1997, No 47, p. 364f); 
Herman’s misinterpretation is followed by A. Lan n i: Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical 
Athens. Cambridge 2006, p. 30.
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text of his misfortunes, that of an erotic rivalry, and most of all (3.4) his own, too 
foolish for his age engagement in a homosexual affair with Theodotus (παρὰ τὴν 
ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ μειρακίον διατιθείς). The repetition of 
the very same epithet (ἀνόητος, ἀνοητότερον) is no coincidence.
It should also be noted that the speaker’s non-litigious attitude provides con-
venient means to validate his diegesis: it gives a persuasive (since in itself it is an 
embarassing — to a limited degree — confession) reason to explain the speaker’s 
idleness in the face of Simon’s offenses, his poneria, his paranoma, his hybris. The 
speaker thus shields himself from the obvious suspicion his diegesis might arouse 
in the minds of the jury: ‘if indeed you have been subject to all theses heinous 
indignities, why haven’t you undertaken any legal action’.
Conclusion
Negation and trivialization — these two chief objectives of the defense in Lys. 
3, and, in fact, chief objectives of any defense whatsoever, are achieved in the 
speech firstly and foremostly through contrasting ethopoiiai. The speaker rebuts 
the claims of the plaintiff, arguing from probability, that unlike his adversary, he 
is not mad, and only a madman would be capable of doing the deeds he is being 
accused of. The speaker trivializes the incident under trial as unworthy of prosecu-
tion, unless of course, the prosecutor is a sycophant — like Simon. Underlying 
these is yet another tendency, conveyed through Simon’s hubristic ethopoiia. This 
tendency is voiced out in a theoretical treatise on composing successful speeches, 
claiming the authorship of Aristotle himself. Its argument is: “[…] it seems to 
me that it comes close to no injustice at all, whenever one is subject to the mis-
treatment by which he himself abused others, as for example, if someone batters 
(αἰκίσαιτο) one who is accustomed to assault others with hybris (ὑβρίζειν)” (Rhet. 
1373a). Whatever befell Simon, he certainly had it coming. 
